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Comparing the economic performances between UK and Euroland, the 
appropriate and obvious question should be: why does not Euroland replace its 
euro with the British pound? However, economy does not represent all the 
interests of the human beings. They believe in values beyond the economy. 
Right! It may well be that Euroland citizens, once with the euro, feel much more 
confiance in themselves, as part of a larger world, as they trust the monetary and 
political decision makers of the EU Institutions. If that was the truth, the European 
integration process should proceed just like a ball thrown against standing skittle-
pins waiting to be got down! Unfortunately, that is not the case. The authors try to 
point out some reasons to understand those British people who love to look at 
the euro experience, sitting in their armchairs and, above all, without loosing their 





From January 1st, 1973, UK is in every respect a country member of the 
European Union (EU) and consequently is one of the addressees of its huge 
legislation and effects deriving from it. On February 27th, 1992 the Treaty on 
European Union (thereafter Treaty) is signed in Maastricht and represents the 
beginning of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) creation to be 
achieved through three stages. On October 1997, British government, by means 
of his Chancellor of the Exchequer Mr Gordon Brown, using the Treaty opting-out 
clause, announces the intention of non-participating to the third stage, the one 
that would have led the twelve country members of the EU to adopt one 
European currency, the euro. Hence, UK maintains its own autonomy in the fields 
of monetary policy and exchange rate policy. UK maintains its British pound as 
national currency unless a popular referendum, to be shortly held, will indicate 
the will of replacing the British pound for the euro. UK, however, participates to 
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  3the European System of Central Banks (Esbc) where EU monetary policy is 
decided through the Governor Council and the Executive Committee. In other 
words the presence of the UK in the EMU testimonies the non-necessary 
coincidence between a monetary union and one single currency
1. Nevertheless, 
the passage towards a monetary union with a single currency makes complete 
and mature an incomplete union
2. The British choice comes from a number of 
criticisms either on the EU economic policies, the monetary policy and the rate of 
exchange policy, to be accepted by accepting the euro, or on the negative result 
of a number of economic tests, which will be explained in the next sections. In 
this paper we point out that the British opting-out choice might be explained not 
only by economic worrying views, but more important, by political concerns. We 
shall start however with the former, leaving the latter to be discussed later. 
 
 
2. On The Renounce of the Exchange Rate Policy 
 
Building a single currency implies, as known, the disappearance of the exchange 
rate policy for a country within a union. A country will be keen to accept a new 
currency if it is convinced that the advantages of having it will prevail over the 
disadvantages. Therefore, is the UK convinced that the loss of the exchange rate 
policy implies more advantages than disadvantages? Though this point should 
not be the most important one when compared with the others, still it concurs to 
understand the British view on the euro. 
As Mundell (1961) showed
3, the evaluation of costs and benefits of building up 
a monetary union with a single currency takes place through the theory of the 
optimal currency area (Oca)
4. An Oca will be justified if advantages will exceed 
disadvantages.  
According to that theory, in the presence of fixed rates of exchange, an 
eventual negative asymmetric shock that hit the economy of a country A will 
cause, at the same time, a worsening in its balance of payments and an 
                                                 
1 AAVV Dal Piano Delors all’unione economica e monetaria Cedam, Padova, 1991, p.85. 
2 Delors Report. 
3 M UNDELL, R. A theory of optimal currency areas in American Economic Review, 1961, pp.657-665. 
Mundell analysis is the first exposition of the subject and is preceded by works of Meade (Nobel 1977) 
such as MEADE, J. The balance of payment problems of a European free trade area in Economic Journal, 1957, 
pp.379-396. and SCITOVSKY, T such as L’integrazione economica dell’Europa occidentale dal puntodi vista della 
teoria Feltrinelli, Milano, 1961. 
4 The concept of Oca, the traditional one, is linked to the debate on the choice of a fixed or flexible rates of exchange 
regime to achieve a re-equilibrium of the balance of payment, debate developed in consequence of the crisis of the fixed 
rates of exchange international monetary system built up in 1944 at Bretton Woods and of the establishment, of a 
flexible rates of exchange regime. (SPAGNOLO, L.V. L’equilibrio in un’economia aperta Editoriale Scientifica, 
Napoli, 2002, p.160). More exactly, once cleared the inability of both the regimes to assure an 
international stability, the Oca was an alternative model represented by a monetary union within which 
there had to be one currency. In the Mundell view, as not all countries take advantage from a flexible 
rates of exchange regime, it was better that i) a number n of countries be grouped in a number m of 
monetary areas, ii) inside each monetary area it was appropriate a fixed rate of exchange, iii) between 
the m monetary areas there ought to be flexible rates of exchanges iv) the flexible rates of exchanges 
between monetary areas would be optimal if internal mobility and external immobility of factors, 
labour and capital, (ricardian) hypotheses were respected (SPAGNOLO, L.V. op. cit. p.161). 
  4improvement in that of a country B. Because of the presence of a fixed rate of 
exchange, the re-equilibrium in the balance of payments of the two countries will 
take place if, and only if, at least two conditions are met: a perfect flexibility of 
wages and a high mobility in the labour market. In fact, country A, because of a 
lack of demand will experience lower prices, higher unemployment, a weakening 
of trade unions, and consequently lower wages. Country B will experience 
exactly the opposite effect: an excess of demand, higher prices, higher 
employment, a strengthening of trade unions, and consequently, higher wages. 
Thus, country A, because of the lower wages, will increase the demand of labour, 
employment and output. Country B, because of the higher wages, will decrease 
employment and output. Prices and wages will increase in country A and 
decrease in country B, re-establishing the external equilibrium in both the 
countries. 
In the presence of flexible rates of exchange, an eventual negative asymmetric 
shock on country A will cause a worsening of its balance of payments, deriving 
from a worsening either in its current account balance, due to a decrease in the 
exports, or in the short run capital flows, due to an increase in the short run 
capital outflows. The domestic currency will depreciate and, at the same time, the 
currency of a country B will appreciate. Such depreciation and appreciation will 
increase exports and capital inflows in country A and decrease exports and 
increase capital outflows in country B. The balance of payments of country A will 
improve, while the one of country B will worsen, re-establishing the external 
equilibrium in both the countries.  
On one side flexible rates of exchange reflect the up and down of the markets, 
and the only danger with them might be due to high exchange rates volatility and 
inflation without the possibility for it to be exported to the rest of the world. On the 
other side fixed rates of exchange need the fulfilment of the two above conditions 
(i.e. perfect flexibility of prices and wages and high mobility in the labour market), 
conditions that the UK believes do not exist, or, at least, do not yet exist within 
Euroland. Evidently, apart from the above mentioned advantages of having 
flexible rates of exchange, the UK believes that the danger linked to the flexible 
rates of exchange is preferable to the non existence of the flexibility of wages and 
labour mobility within the EU member countries.  
Thus, the EU area might not be an Oca and consequently the disadvantages 
of abandoning the exchange rate policy is not at all balanced by the advantages 
of replacing the British pound with the euro.  
In fact the exchange rate policy, if successful, may only temporary help an 
economy to draw a sigh of relief, but cannot be thought as the right one for 
pursuing stability and growth. 
On one hand it is true that for an exchange rate policy to be successful we 
need i) the fulfilment of the Bickerdicke-Robinson condition, according to which 
the balance of the current account improves, when the national currency 
depreciates, if, and only if, it will result (pXX/pMM)￿X+￿M>1, where X and M are 
the quantities of exports and imports, pX and pM their prices, and ￿X and ￿M their 
elasticities to a devaluations of the rate of exchange
5, and ii) that the other 
countries with which the country devaluating has more exchanges will not 
                                                 
5 See, among others, SPAGNOLO, L.V. op. cit.  
  5devaluate too their own currencies. On the other hand it is also true that, in the 
absence of prices and wages perfect flexibility and high labour mobility, yet there 
will not be a convincing reason to participate to a union. 
However, examples of success in using appropriately the exchange rate policy 
to help the national economy come from the government decisions in France 
during the years ’82-’83, when the devaluations of the French franc helped the 
domestic economy to recover from years of stagnation. Denmark during 1982, 
and above all Belgium, whose devaluation of 8,5% improved the percentage of 
current accounts from -3,5% in 1981 to +2,0% in 1986, and of employment, in the 
same period, from -2% to +1,0% when the average within the Union was +0,8%. 
If, as we mentioned above, under certain condition fixed exchange rates might 
be appropriate, why should the UK believe that those conditions (i.e. perfect 
flexibility of wages and high mobility in the labour market) are not met in 
Euroland? The answer passes through two basic points: the institutional 
differences in the labour market in the countries participating to the union and the 
political attitude of the governments of those countries towards unemployment 
and inflation.  
About the first point, countries may be different according to the degree of 
concentration of their trade unions: the higher that degree, the higher the 
proportion of workers represented by the same institution, the stronger the 
pressures put on employers to obtain higher wages
6. Within the Union, the UK is 
characterised by a low degree of concentration of the trade unions, compared 
with that of other countries
7, and it might be difficult to achieve one homogeneous 
degree within the Union.  
About the second point, countries assign different weights to the trade off 
between the rate of increase of wages and the level of unemployment. Some of 
them are more prone than others to accept a lower employment rate, due to 
higher wages; others will advocate the idea that the rate of unemployment must 
not go beyond a maximum level which, if exceeded, will imply the use of 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. That is to say each country has its 
own utility function satisfied at the point where the government utility function (the 
demand of labour of the whole community) meets the trade union’s utility function 
(the level of real wages claimed by trade unions)
8.  
Traditionally, on one hand the UK has always considered economic liberalism 
as an unquestionable priority to help growth and development and, on the other 
one
9, has never forgotten to support families, schools, researches, and social 
services in the light of the Beveridge philosophy
10. Any complete union, 
obviously, entails an agreement about the two points above, and the UK might be 
convinced that the compromise for accepting the euro would weaken and worsen 
its freedom of decisions. 
                                                 
6 DE GRAUWE, P. The economics of Monetary Union Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000. 
7 SACHS, J. D.and BRUNO, M. Economics and worldwide stagflation Harvard University, 1995. 
8 SOLOW, R. La moderna teoria macroeconomica Laterza, 1998; SOLOW, R. Inflazione, disoccupazione e politica 
monetaria Etas, 1998, §4.1. 
9 Apart from the Thatcher government. 
10 BEVERIDGE, J. Il piano Beveridge. La relazione di sir W. Beveridge al governo britannico sulla protezione sociale. 
Rapporto ufficiale, 1943. 
  6As mentioned above, the second point for building an Oca is the existence of a 
high labour mobility
11. From this point of view it is evident the lack of such mobility 
in the EU area. Lack due to a number of important reasons such as, differences 
in the language
12, culture, law, uses, traditions etc... Therefore, it might be 
possible that one currency, the euro, will not fill all the gaps involved by such 
differences or, at least, will not be a substitute for them, unless a higher degree of 
social feeling and cultural harmonization between EU countries is achieved. Until 
then, the abandon of the pound, and exchange rate policy, might be an 
unreasonable cost to pay. 
 
 
3. On The Diversity of Monetary Policy in the UK and Euroland 
 
Once accepted the euro as the national currency, the UK will cease deciding its 
own monetary policy. However, while exchange rates policies will become a non-
sense within Euroland, still the UK, once belonging to Euroland, has to share 
decisions, and management, on Euroland monetary policy. Such a policy can be 
only one, and precisely the one representing the expression of the emerging will 
of all the countries belonging to Euroland.  
In principle, national monetary authorities may have, and generally have, their 
own view about objectives to pursue and the means to achieve them. The 
diversity derives from different economic realities, perspectives and evaluations 
of such objectives and means. However, in the end, those authorities have to 
reach only one decision. Inevitable adjustments will be accepted, in the end, in 
the name of belonging to a union and, inevitably, part of the power of deciding 
their own monetary policy will be given to the new authority. As often happens in 
many fields of economics, social and political environment, and also in our case, 
there could be an interval of many (infinite) diversities, varying from the most 
insignificant to the deepest of them. No matter about the former, but what will 
happen in case the latter prevails?  
Firstly, therefore, there is an urgent need to find out an acceptable way of 
making the smallest countries count when important decisions are taken. 
Secondly, should the (new) monetary policy institution have only one objective, 
for example, assuring price stability, or more objectives, say, price stability, 
growth, external equilibrium, etc…? Furthermore, should the monetary institution 
be absolutely independent of political power, transparent in its decisions, and 
accountant towards other institutional powers? What kind of intermediate targets 
should it firstly achieve, before achieving the final goal? The above are only some 
of the disquieting, or at least unease, questions which may arise when trying to 
tackle the delicate problem for a country to cease part of its monetary sovereignty 
to a new institution in the name of belonging to a union. 
 
 
3.1 On Diversities in the Objectives 
                                                 
11 See, in particular, JOHNSON, C. In with the euro, out with the pound. The single currency for Britain Penguin 
Books, 1996. 
12 See, among many others, BINI SMAGHI, L. L’euro Il Mulino, 1998. 
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In principle, price stability (that is controlling the rate of inflation) is the final goal 
of any monetary policy. In order to achieve that goal monetary authorities, 
generally, use three means, that is, fixing the rate of interest, using open market 
operations and fixing the rate of the bank reserve-ratio. In the absence of 
diversities in the objectives to be achieved and considering the three means 
mentioned above, why should not the UK accept the euro? Rather, an 
acceptance of the euro would lead to more price stability in the advantage of 
both, the UK and Euroland. The reason might be that any monetary policy 
spreads its effects over the financial market, only if monetary policy actions are 
synchronised with financial markets. That happens if, and only if, the latter trusts 
the former. Financial markets are in synchrony with monetary policies only when, 
traditionally, monetary policy announcements have been proved to be true for a 
long time, which implies monetary policy credibility. It might well be that the UK is 
concerned about maintaining such a credibility once monetary policy decisions 
are to be shared with other culturally different oriented decision makers. 
The reason lies in the definition of the different task of the British monetary 
authority, in comparison with that of the Ecb (European central bank), when 
dealing with inflation. The main goal of the Ecb, in terms of controlling inflation, is 
achieved when the rate of increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices 
(HICP) is, within the euro area, somewhere between 0% and 2%, however less 
than 2%
13. To On the other hand the Bank of England fulfils that goal at a Retail 
Prices Index excluding mortgage interest payments (RPIX) increasing at a 
maximum of 2,5%. However, due to a different method of calculating the rate of 
inflation in the UK and Euroland, it may happen, in the long term, that the two 
values might be coincident. What if they won’t? What if the value measured by 
the Ecb were lower than the other one? Will an EU deflationary process involve, 
in the UK too, a fall in employment and output?  
This is the reason why the Ecb, at the beginning of its activity, stated precisely 
that the above rate of 2% has to be referred to as a medium term rate. However, 
the definition of medium term itself, given by the Ecb, is still rather unclear. 
Further, how can one accept a 2% rate of increase in the HICP, as referring to 
the whole euro area when it is clear that the euro area is not yet a homogeneous 
area? In fact, prices for the same good vary not only between countries 
belonging to the euro area, but also between adjacent areas belonging to the 
same country or even to adjacent areas of the same town. It would be very 
unlikely that we will ever achieve price homogeneity across the different countries 
participating to the EU.  
                                                 
13 To be precise: “Although it clearly establishes the maintenance of price stability as the primary objective of the Ecb, 
the Treaty does not give a precise definition of what is meant by price stability. In order to specify this objective more 
precisely, the Governing Council of the Ecb announced the following quantitative definition on October 13
th, 1998: 
“Price stability shall be defined as a year-on-year increase in the HICP for the euro area of below 2%” in Ecb The 
monetary policy of Ecb Ecb, Frankfurt am Main, 2001, p.38. Further, p.39, “First, neither prolonged inflation 
nor prolonged deflation is consistent with the definition. The phrase “below 2%” clearly delineates the upper boundary for 
the rate of measured HICP inflation that is consistent with price stability. At the same time, the use of the word 
“increase” in the definition shows that deflation, i.e., declines in the level of the HICP covers a wide range of consumer 
expenditure”.  
  8In other words, one monetary policy for one (euro) area needs one common 
market, a market that, as already stated by the Treaty of Rome (1957), assures 
perfect mobility of persons, goods and capitals. Though undeniable progress in 
this respect has been made during the past half a century, yet there is a lack of 
flexibility in the adjustment of real and monetary variables that prevents the euro 
area from being a perfect competitive one. 
The uncertainties over a number of points involved by too many unanswered 
questions represent a threat to the above mentioned crucial requirement of any 
respectable monetary authority, that is the credibility of the latter with financial 
markets. In this respect one may well believe that UK, being aware of the long 
time British authority took to build up that credibility, might be concern about 
maintaining it alive once accepted the euro. 
However, neither the Bank of England, nor the Ecb have as only task that of 
assuring price stability. In fact, for example, the Bank of England has to help 
government to make effective its economic policy. The stability of prices appears 
to have the same importance as other government objectives. The Ecb has also 
a number of objectives belonging to the real economy such as employment, 
output, and so on. Therefore, apparently there is no difference between the two. 
But, in fact, the meaning is not the same; the former, through the monetary 
policy, is asked to co-operate with the government in implementing its economic 
policy
14; the latter has, first of all, the task of assuring price stability, and only after 
having achieved that, looks at the real economy. The difference will appear clear 
in the next section.  
 
 
3.2 On the Diversities of the Means 
 
In the previous section we pointed out that the main objective of a monetary 
authority is price stability. However, is the path any monetary policy has to follow 
to achieve price stability unique? That is, is there any choice between a number 
of intermediate targets to be achieved before achieving the final goal, or rather 
there is only one path. If there are different paths and therefore different 
intermediate targets, how should one choose between them? 
With respect to the first and secondary tasks, the Ecb monetary policy is based 
upon two pillars, a monetary pillar and a second one made up of a set of 
variables of the real economy. The first one, the so-called money targeting, that 
allows achieving price stability, is the Ecb’s main choice. It comes from the Ecb 
conviction that inflation is essentially a monetary phenomenon, and consequently 
it does depend on the quantity of money in the economy. Thus, once fixed, let us 
say, at a maximum of 2% the increase of the rate of inflation, supposing an 
increase of GDP by 1% and an increase of the money circulation velocity by 
0,2%, the amount of money supply has to increase by 2,8%
15. The second pillar 
sweetens the strong and true first one, as it shows an Ecb keeping also into 
                                                 
14 Other objectives of the Bank of England are the maintaining of the stability of the financial system 
both at home and assure the efficiency of UK financial services. 
15 According to the quantitative theory of money, ∆m=∆p+∆y-∆v, where m is the quantity of money, y is 
the real GDP, v is the circulation velocity of money. Thus 2,8%=2%+1%-0,2%. 
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basis of the first pillar, although not automatically: in such case expectations 
would lead to obvious speculative activity. 
The direct inflation targeting is the British authority’s choice according to which 
the rate of inflation represents both the intermediate target and the final goal. In 
other words, British monetary policy deals with the elimination of the gap 
between the expected and planned rate of inflation. That is pursued by 
monitoring and using any variables able to reduce that gap, not only the quantity 
of money supplied. At the same time, the whole of its action is extremely 
transparent towards public and, broadly speaking, the financial markets. 
Therefore, it is implicit in our example that, by accepting the euro the UK has to 
replace its direct inflation targeting with the money targeting. That might carry on 
a high cost indeed for the UK because of a number of reasons.  
The first reason is linked to the concept of the neutrality of the money
16, which 
appears to belong to the Ecb, and does not belong to Bank of England. 
Consequently, the Bank of England has to help government in implementing its 
policy, while pursuing its duty of price stability; the Ecb only addresses a yearly 
report on its activity to the European Parliament, the Commission and the Council 
of Europe. On the other hand, since in the British view the money is non neutral 
then the Bank of England is accountant towards the government.  
The second reason is a consequence of the first one. In fact, the multi-purpose 
Bank of England task (to assure the stability of prices and help government in 
realizing its economic policy) implies a co-operative action with government. 
Monetary policy and fiscal policy are to co-operate to achieve price stability and 
growth. There are two objectives and two means. Co-operation does not mean 
the presence of a leader and follower. On the contrary, since there are two 
objectives and two independent means to be used to achieve them, it is 
respected the well known Tinbergen principle, according to which a model with 
predetermined objectives (i.e.with n independent objectives) must have n 
independent means and all of them have to co-operate altogether to the 
achievements of the objectives
17. The Ecb philosophy of the two pillars yields to 
the inevitable consequence of giving priority to monetary variables when 
compared with the real ones: the Tinbergen principle is not satisfied
18. For 
example suppose that, in the absence of coordination, the rate of interest is 
increased in order to reduce inflation and that, at the same time, government 
decides an expansionary fiscal policy to reduce the rate of unemployment. 
Monetary policy will fade away fiscal policy expectations, contributing to lead the 
economy towards undesired effects. It would not appear hazardous to imagine 
                                                 
16 Money is considered neutral if her variations do not affect variations in the real variables, but only 
in the level of prices. 
17 TINBERGEN, J. Economic policy: principles and design North Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam, 1956. 
18 It might be argued that the Tinbergen principle is not only respected by the Ecb, but even stated by 
the Treaty (of the European Union): the Ecb has to act in harmony with the Ecofin Council and the 
Economic and Financial Committee. However, the Ecb co-operative activity cannot be interpreted 
and put in practice as the Tinbergen principle would suggest, because of the simple reason that, once 
again by statute, the Ecb takes, primarily, responsibility for the stability of prices. That comes from the 
conviction according to which, without assuring the stability of prices, any economic policy is destined 
to fail. 




4. The Independence of the Ecb 
 
The creation of the Ecb proved to be a revival of the ancient debate about 
whether a central bank should, or should not, be independent of the political 
power
19. As to the Ecb, the principle of independence from the political power is 
stated by the art. 107 of the Treaty: “When exercising the powers and carrying 
out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by this Treaty and the Statute of 
the ESCB, neither the ECB, nor a national central bank, nor any member of their 
decision-making bodies shall seek or take instructions from Community 
institutions or bodies, from any government of a Member State or from any other 
body….” The passive defence of such a principle is institutional, being exerted 
from external interferences when Ecb is pursuing statutory objectives, personal
20, 
through the process of nomination and the length of the charges
21 and functional, 
since the Ecb is given a number of financial and accountant tools and the 
responsibility of drawing up the Escb (European System of Central Bank) 
consolidated balance sheet
22. The active defence of that principle takes the form 
of the prohibition, stated by the art. 104 of the Treaty “Overdraft facilities or any 
other type of credit facility with the Ecb or with the central banks of the Member 
States (hereinafter referred to as “national central banks”) in favour of Community 
institutions or bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member 
States shall be prohibited, as shall the purchase directly from them by the ECB or 
national central banks of debt instruments.” and the art. 104 A “Any measure, not 
based on prudential considerations, establishing privileged access by Community 
institutions or bodies, central governments, regional, local or other public 
authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of 
Member States to financial institutions shall be prohibited.” In fact, the 
independence of the Ecb from the political power is a condition sine qua non of 
the existence of the Ecb herself. Moreover, a number of economic models, as the 
representative agent model by Rogoff
23, have been developed to advocate the 
thesis according to which the Ecb should have had to minimize the function of the 
loss 
                                                 
19See, among many others, HABIB, M.M. Saggio sull’indipendenza della banca centrale in Studi economici, 
n.70, 2000/1; SPAGNOLO L.V. The Role of the European System of Central Banks in the European Integration 
Process in Building the New Europe, Vol. I: The Single Market and Monetary Unification, edited by 
Baldassarri M. and Mundell R. The Macmillan Press, London and New York, 1993. 
20 The same art. 107 “The Community institutions and bodies and the government of the Member States undertake 
to respect this principle and not to seek to influence the members of the decision-making bodies of the Ecb or of the 
national central banks in the performance of their tasks.” 
21 The art.11 of the Protocol (of the Treaty) statues the length of the charge of the members of the 
Executive Board in eight years. 
22 See Protocol, Chapter V, art. 25-27. 
23 BARRO, R. and GORDON, D. Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy in Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 12, 1983, pp.101-120; KYDLAND, F .E. and PRESCOTT, E.E. Rules rather than 





where L is the loss, p-p* is the difference between current and planned rate of 
inflation, u-u* is the difference between current and planned rate of 
unemployment and b is the value the minimizer assigns to the relative 
importance between inflation and unemployment
24. According to the model, the 
lower the value assigned by the central banker (the agent) to b, the more 
conservative she is. Her credibility is higher, the lower the value assigned to b 
since a low value means more control on the rate of inflation. Consequently, at 
the beginning of the Ecb activity, it was essential for the Ecb to show that it was 
conservative, above all, that it was even more conservative than most 
conservative existing central banks. However, is the priority given to the rate of 
inflation over unemployment justified?
25, is it true that the degree of credibility of a 
central banker increases with the degree of conservativeness?, is it true that 
more conservativeness means more credibility?, is it true that more 
independence means more credibility and, hence, more conservativeness? Most 
important, who should the minimizer be: the representative agent (the central 
banker) or, rather, the society, that is to say, the government chosen by the 
society? Further, once accepted the idea of a rate of inflation mainly linked to the 
quantity supplied of money, would not the Ecb, with its monetary policy, make 
dependent the fiscal policies of the governments of the member countries? 
These are only some of the questions needing a satisfactory answer.  
The British model of central bank, though is left independent in the 
accomplishment of the main task, on the other hand, it is essentially considered, 
as explained above, an institution helping government in reaching the goals set 
by the government itself. That comes from the fundamental UK conception of the 
non-neutrality of the money.  
However, the principle of independence might be also seen in a slightly 
different way. In fact, is really the Ecb an institution independent, super-partes, 
above the will of the member States expressed by their Governors? And how 
many activities are, still now, maintained by the national central banks and how 
many delegated to the Ecb
26? Finally, is the monetary policy really conceived by 
                                                 
24In the Rogoff model, the agent (the conservative central banker), optimizes the trade off between 
inflation and unemployment minimizing the Loss function. In fact, she cannot reach such objective 
because of the simple reason that she has no autonomy in deciding both the rate of inflation and 
unemployment. She can only fix the former as objective, and not the latter. In any case a central 
banker is said to be conservative if she assigns more importance to the rate of inflation than to 
unemployment. 
25 SPAGNOLO, L.V. La convergenza di Maastricht: una misura della divergenza Giappichelli, Torino, 1997. 
26 Graziani A. thinks of the Escb chosen as a hybrid one. Apparentely, it looks like a highly centralized 
system in which every decision is made by the Ecb, which finances directly national banks of the 
member countries. That can be seen by the Ecb balance sheet, where the assets include financements 
in favour of national banks of the member countries and do not those in favour of the national central 
banks. However, the system is deeply modified being the implementation of the monetary policy 
assigned to the single national central banks, to which has been left a set of large powers. 
GRAZIANI, A. La politica monetaria della Banca Centrale Europea  in Rivista Italiana degli Economisti n. 
2004/1 Supplement dedicated to the works of the 44th yearly scientific meeting, Salerno, October, 
24th-25th, 2003, Il Mulino, Bologna, Italy. 
  12the Ecb or, rather, influenced by the national bankers views?
27 If the monetary is 
influenced by national bankers view then it would be a difficult task for the UK to 
see its view accepted! In all cases, the Ecb independence can only be relative: it 
cannot be absolute, since it depends on the international rate of exchange 
systems
28. Keeping into account the international rate of exchange context, there 
could be different views on what policy be advisable. At the same time all of them 
could probably be justifiable on the basis of different arguments. However, they 
will imply different consequences in different member countries. 
 
 
5  A Pragmatic View 
 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair described the decision on whether or not joining 
the euro as the most important decision of the Labour party and promised to call 
a referendum on the issue. As a consequence of the Labour pro-Euro policy, in 
1997 the Treasury announced five economic tests on UK entry to the Euro. The 
tests are essentially based on assessing the convergence of the UK business 
cycle with the European business cycle; assessing the degree of flexibility of the 
UK economy to adapt and adjust to changes; considering the effect on 
investment in the UK; considering the advantages for the financial services sector 
once joined the Euro; finally, considering employment and growth prospects. 
Despite the five economic tests, for quite few people the decision to join the 
Euro will not be an easy one, and it will be based more on the “emotional facts” of 
having to scratch the pound than economic concerns. 
The Treasury considers the test on convergence an important step towards a 
successful single currency. It says that, in order for the UK economy to fully be 
able to benefit from a single currency, it has to converge with Europe and show 
that the convergence is sustainable. With regard convergence, in the past the 
UK`s economic cycle has been, most of the times, divergent and more volatile 
than others in Europe and more linked to the USA cycle. Today, Britain is 
experiencing a period of good economic growth and stability while most of the 
European countries (see for example France, Germany, and Italy amongst the 
others) on the other hand, experience a low growth with relatively high level of 
unemployment. The British cycle therefore seems to be still invariably out of 
phase with respect to most of the major European countries. Furthermore, the 
                                                 
27The art.10 of the Protocol of the Treaty statues “In accordance with Article 109a(1) of this Treaty, the 
Governing Council shall comprise the members of the Executive Board of the ECB and the Governors of the central 
banks.” At present, the Executive Committee consists of six members (art. 11), consequently the 
Governor Council includes the six members of the Executive Committee and twelve national central 
banks Governors. Though the Executive Committee decisions are independent, those of the national 
central bank Governors might be not. In the case when Euroland were hit by symmetric shock, the 
Governing Council decisions might coincide with the Executive Committee ones. But what will 
happen in case of an asymmetric shock? See the interesting discussion of DE  GRAUWE, P ., 
DEWACHTER, P., and AKSOY, Y. The European central bank decisions, rules and macroeconomic performance in 
CEPR, Discussion Paper n. 2067. 
28 SPAGNOLO, L. V. L’equilibrio..,op.cit., pp.174-175; SPAGNOLO L.V. European Economic Convergence and 
The International Monetary System in De Pecunia, (number dedicated to the memory of Robert Triffin), 
Bruxelles,1993. 
  13UK mortgage market historically depends on variable interest rates while the 
European market is mainly characterised by fixed interest rate. The boom in 
housing markets with the consequent increase in the value of properties across 
the country has increased the borrowing power of the UK residents. The 
consequent increase in disposable income has increased consumption. On the 
other hand as a consequence of the boom in housing market, house prices have 
seen a two-digit increase in various areas of the country. The different rate of 
borrowing between Euroland and UK, and the house price inflation might be 
more than a simple concern for Tony Blair in order to schedule a reasonable time 
for joining the Euro. In fact, this concern has been recently expressed clearly by 
Gordon Brown when he announced that the UK was not ready yet for the euro 
and the Prime Minister accepted the chancellor`s view. 
Another important test is about the flexibility or ability of the economy to adjust 
to changes. In fact as we stressed in the previous sections a single currency 
leads to a loss of domestic control over monetary policy. Given the risk of future 
shocks, firms would need to be flexible in terms of pricing and margins in order to 
respond to asymmetric shocks, and employees would need to increase their 
skills in order to adapt to changes in the labour market.  
With regard investment the treasury believes that a single currency, by 
creating an area of low inflation and high stability, and by removing currency 
changeover costs, would attract investment in Britain. However, perhaps the 
impact of the euro on the thousands of small business across the country might 
have been miss-calculated. In fact, the adoption of the euro will imply additional 
costs deriving from new accounting systems, price labels etc…Therefore, small 
business will not benefit from it and will pass on to customers the increase in 
costs by rounding up prices. 
The City of London has always been one of the major financial centres in the 
world. According to the Treasury the euro will affect financial services 
immediately, therefore it is important to see if the City is prepared for it and if the 
introduction of the euro is advantageous for the sector. It is not difficult for 
anyone involved in the financial sector to see that the level of euro transactions 
on the UK stock exchange and secondary markets has been growing fast. 
Therefore, a part from operational costs and operational risk involved with the 
introduction of the euro, the City should be able to fully adapt in short time to the 
new currency. 
The final test concerns employment and growth. The introduction of the euro 
should lead to low inflation and high stability for the whole Euro area (Britain 
included) and therefore a high growth and employment. However, as mentioned 
above, convergence and flexibility are two important factors in order to achieve 
these goals. Therefore a decision on whether or not this test has been satisfied is 
to be taken by the Treasury by looking at the “fundamental” structure of the UK 
economy and considering flexibility and convergence. However, it is unclear what 
convergence may imply in this context given that the UK GDP has been growing 
much faster than the GDP in most of the largest economies in Europe! 
 
 




30 Great Britain is governed by its Parliament, not by its logic 
31. That was to lay stress on the British undeniable and unquestionable principle 
of national sovereignty, which is the legal capability of the national decision 
maker institutions to make their choices without being subject to any external 
restrictions. Coherently, from the very beginning of the European integration 
process
32, UK has been the advocate of the inter-government confederal model 
opposite to the supranational federalist one
33. As known, the main difference 
between those two models is that only in the former national sovereignty is 
assured. On the other hand, the latter keeps into account either the interests and 
needs of the members, regions or States, that it is part of, or those of the new 
entity, the federal State. The tasks of the members and of the new entity should 
have to be exactly defined. EU, though represents none of the two models, 
having elements of both, it is moving towards the direction of the latter. 
Therefore, Disraeli sentence is no longer a mirror of the current national 
sovereignty.  
EU laws are based upon the self-executing,  supremacy and pre-emption 
principles. The UK, with the European Act of 1972, accepted the self-executing, 
or direct applicability principle
34 and consequently its logical consequence, that is 
the supremacy principle, according to which community law prevails over national 
law, principle that is the same for all the member countries
35. The supremacy 
principle revolutionises member countries law system, by transferring part of the 
national sovereignty to the Union in the name of the principle that there cannot be 
a case of clashing interest between any of the member countries and the Union. 
                                                 
29The subject of this § needs, obviously, a width and depth well beyond the objective of this paper, 
which only represents an attempt to give an understandable and condensed synthesis of the reasons 
why the UK might not been keen to joint the euro. 
30DISRAELI, BENJAMIN (1804-81), 1st Earl of Beaconsfield, British Conservative prime minister (1868, 
1874-80). 
31BOGDANOR V. The United Kingdom and the European Union: light on the relationship in Britain in Europe, 
The London School of Economics and Political Science, p.28. 
32 DUFF A. Britain and Europe. The different relationship, in WESTLAKE M. (editor) The European Union 
beyond Amsterdam. New concepts of European integration, Routledge, 1998. Zurcher A.J. La lotta per l’Europa 
unita 1940-1958, in Cultura e società n. 29, Opere nuove, 1963. 
33 As we know, the debate on federalism against confederalism comes out at from the functionalism, a 
doctrine according to which the form of a thing should be determined by its use. For a definition of the term 
functionalism, see COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY, Glasgow, 1990, p.614. In the European integration 
process, the functionalist pragmatic view was applied to economic sectors of the economy through 
common policies to be managed by common supranational agencies, and leaded to the throwing 
down of the custom barriers to build a common way to political sectors. The functionalism 
adaptability to the member states needs was, at the same time, its strength and its weakness. The 
development of common economic policies was not followed by net abandon of the political 
sovereignty. On the contrary, the crude reality represented by the endless and still unsolved debate 
between federalism and confederalism re-emerged. PINDER J. The building of the European Union 3 rd 
edition, Oxford University Press, 1998. WALLACE W. Less than a Federation, more than a regime: the 
Community as a political system in ….Policy in the European Community, John Wiley & Sons, 1990. 
34 KENT P. Law of the European Union 3d Ed., Pearson Education, 2001, p.58. See also eurotreaties.com. 
35 CONSTANTINESCU L.J. La specificité du droit communautaire in Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen, 
1965. 
  15However, since such a principle is more a perspective or a wish than a reality, it 
is understandable that all the member countries have difficulties in accepting it, 
as it is. Once accepted it, in the case of a clashing law, the UK would be judged 
by the European Court of Justice. Therefore, in order to accept that principle, the 
UK should be convinced that the democracy power is stronger and better 
represented in the community law system than at home, and that a democratic 
deficit no longer exists at the heart of the EU making law process. It is also 
because of this, that once accepted the euro, since the Ecb will be the EU 
monetary policy decision maker, the UK will have to accept the principles of the 
neutrality of the money and independence of the Ecb, which contrasts his 
traditional view.  
Regarding the pre-emption principle
36, it is known that, under the pressures of 
a number of member States, including UK and Germany, it became, with The 
Treaty, the subsidiarity principle. Such principle is based upon the presumption 
that, within the EU, the State has competence in making law unless not explicitly 
assigned to the Union
37. Generally, federalism needs this principle to be accepted 
and, as made in the case of the Legislative Scottish Assembly (i.e. the so-called 
devolved matters), clearly defined.  
On the contrary, the subsidiarity principle in the EU seems to work in the 
opposite direction. That is it assigns the more and more making law competence 
to the Union and the less and less to the member States, in the view of building 
up a super State in which a dangerous hierarchy might appropriate the member 
States making law competence
38.  
Participating to a Union, in itself, it needs one identity. A European Union 
needs its own identity, which means one feeling and one will to belong to the 
same Union well beyond belonging to the member country. Furthermore, a 
Federal Union needs the right interpretation of the subsidiarity principle, that is 
leaving the law making process to the member states in the respect of their 
diversities in any subject but those for which the “common feeling” delegates the 
Union.  
At present, it is hard to recognize the existence of one feeling of belonging to 
the same economic, social, cultural and political reality. In other words it does not 
seem possible to believe in the existence of one voice for the European Union 
within itself and towards the rest of the world, before having built one identity for 
one European people.  
Moreover, while the EU institutional persisting democratic deficit needs many 
efforts to be reduced, the increasing community making law process is steadily 
                                                 
36 The pre-emption principle is the purchase of or the right to purchase property in advance of or in preference to others 
. See COLLINS, op. cit., u.v. pre-emption, p. 1208. 
37 CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC POLICY REASEARCH La distribuzione dei poteri nell’Unione Europea. Il principio 
di sussidiarietà nel processo d’integrazione europea Il Mulino, 1995; BECK C. H. European Union law: cases. 
Frank  Emmert, 1999; VANDAMME  J.  European Federalism. Opportunity or Utopia? In WESTLAKE  M. 
(editor) The European Union beyond Amsterdam. New concepts of European Integration Routledge, 1998. 
38 F ERRARI BRAVO L., MOAVERO MILANESI E. Lezioni di Diritto Comunitario 3 rd Edition, Edizione 
Scientifica, 2000. Delors expects an 80% legislation coming from the EU against a 20% of member 
States competence. See DE LEONARDIS M. L’integrazione europea e la Gran Bretagna in Rainero R.H. 
(editor) Storia dell’integrazione europea vol.II L’Europa dai Trattati di Roma alla caduta del muro di Berlino 
Marzorati Editore, 1997; GOZI S. Il governo dell’Europa Il Mulino, Bologna, 2000. 
  16increasing. At the same time, such process is not at all balanced by an increasing 
accountability of the institutions representing it.  
The UK might not be encouraged to replace the pound for the euro until a true 
EU identity will have emerged.  
In our view, the UK reasons for not joining the euro should not be seen as 
steril, vanishing or disrespectful of the EU integration process. Rather, all the 
possible reasons mentioned above, ought to be seen as to contribute to the 
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